Parliamentarians and member states weren’t too thrilled about the comments made by Mark Rutte, NATO secretary-general, in an exchange of views in the European Parliament on Monday (26 January). “If anyone thinks … that the European Union or Europe as a whole can defend itself without the U.S., keep on dreaming,” he said. The remark lays bare a growing tension between European ambition and American primacy in NATO.
Rutte’s bluntness came against a backdrop of renewed European efforts to strengthen defence autonomy. On Wednesday (21 January), the European Parliament adopted its annual report, outlining what Europe must do to defend itself: reinforce air and missile defences, coordinate joint procurement, strengthen drone countermeasures, and build European space capabilities — from early warning systems to secure communications — to respond effectively to Russia and other adversaries’ airspace, hybrid and cyber threats.
At the same time, the European Commission has been putting policy into practice. On Monday (26 January), it approved the second funding wave under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) initiative, bringing the total to over €110 billion in low-cost, long-term loans to strengthen member states’ defence capabilities. The funds incentivise joint procurement, interoperability, and a stronger European defence industrial base. Certain third countries like Ukraine, Norway, Canada, Japan and South Korea take part in common procurement
This is an important step in the right direction. But capability gaps remain. Europe still lacks the strategic enablers that make modern warfare credible: satellites, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), electronic warfare, and mass-producible long-range strike systems. Ukraine’s experience demonstrates the necessity of these tools. The EU’s various defence initiatives, including SAFE, the European Defence Industry Programme, ReArm Europe, and the Military Mobility package, aim to bridge the gap, but integration, procurement speed, and operational coordination remain challenges.
In that sense, Rutte is both right and wrong. He is correct that Europe cannot yet act fully independently of NATO and U.S. support. But he overstates the case if that is taken to imply Europe should not pursue greater autonomy. Everything mentioned before and corresponding mounting industrial and technological investment, Europe is laying the foundations for autonomous decision-making and credible deterrence.
It is clearly needed. Last Friday (23 January), the U.S. Department of War released its 2026 National Defence Strategy, making an unusually explicit point: “Moscow is in no position to make a bid for European hegemony. European NATO dwarfs Russia in economic scale, population, and latent military power.” It goes further, stressing that “Europe taking primary responsibility for its own conventional defence is the answer to the security threats it faces.” Dependence on Washington is no longer assumed. Europe can stop asking whether it is ready. It will be solely responsible for deterring Russia and other adversaries — and with the right investments and coordination, it can be.
